Evolutionary game analysis of public-private cooperative supervision considering trust:taking medical waste management generated from COVID-19 as example

doi:10.16265/j.cnki.issn 1003-3033.2021.07.006

Abstract

Abstract: To upgrade performance of cooperation between government and private enterprise, corresponding evolutionary game models were proposed on basis of constructing public-private cooperation payoff matrixes without and with considering level of trust. Strategies evolution trend of government and private enterprise in managing medical waste generated from COVID-19 under different situations were analyzed. Through numerical examples, evolutionary trajectory of public-private cooperative supervision strategies without and with taking trust level into consideration were implemented, and impact of punishment cost on evolutionary trajectory of both parties in game was analyzed. The results show that it is necessary to devise a punishment mechanism to avoid opportunistic behaviors of private enterprise and establish a trust mechanism to guide private enterprise to provide better quality service for managing medical waste generated from COVID-19.It can make goal regarding maximization of overall profit come true and promote sustainable development of the whole system.

Key words: Corona Virus Disease 2019(COVID-19), medical waste, public-private partnership, trust level, evolutionary game theory

CLC Number:

X913.4

CAO Cejun, ZHU Yanqing, ZHANG Fanshun, LI Xiaoli, YANG Qin. Evolutionary game analysis of public-private cooperative supervision considering trust:taking medical waste management generated from COVID-19 as example[J]. China Safety Science Journal, 2021, 31(7): 38-47.

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